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Abstract. Debate exists over the reasons for the demise of the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade to Brazil in 1850. An “Enlightenment School” of historians highlights the political 
capacity of Brazilian statesmen. Th is perspective discounts slave resistance as infl uencing 
the decisions of high-ranking ministers in Rio de Janeiro. A “Subaltern School” views 
slave resistance as a key variable in causing a permanent halt to disembarkations. In the 
wake of the Revolt of the Malês in 1835 in Salvador, Bahia, the largest urban slave revolt 
in the history of the Americas, numerous observers called for an end to the slave trade. 
Th ese individuals emphasized that continued importations boded ill for the empire. Th is 
essay posits that the arrival of thousands of African slaves to Brazil in the 1830s and 
1840s caused severe social tensions. Elite and popular insecurity were particularly evident 
in the cities of Recife, Pernambuco, Salvador, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. Several events 
caused a shift in opinion among high-ranking ministers and common folk by the late 
1840s. Th e appearance of the British Squadron in Brazilian ports and along the coast 
heightened resistance among slaves and freedpersons. Slave revolts, slave conspiracies, 
fear of Muslim religion and distrust of African freedpersons forced representatives to 
seek a permanent halt to the slave trade. 
Key words: trans-Atlantic slave trade, slave resistance, Revolt of the Malês, African 
freedpersons.
Resumo. Existe um debate sobre as causas da cessação do comércio transatlântico 
de escravos para o Brasil em 1850. A “Escola Iluminista” de historiadores enfatiza a 
capacidade política dos estadistas brasileiros. Esta perspectiva minimiza a infl uência da 
resistência escrava nas decisões dos ministros de alto escalão no Rio de Janeiro. A “Es-
cola Subalterna” vê a resistência escrava como um fator fundamental no fi m permanente 
dos desembarques. Na sequência da Revolta dos Malês, em 1835, em Salvador, Bahia, a 
maior revolta urbana de escravos da história das Américas, muitos observadores pediram 
o fi m do comércio escravista. Estes indivíduos enfatizavam que as contínuas importações 
representavam uma ameaça para o império. Este artigo propõe que a chegada de milha-
res de escravos africanos para o Brasil nas décadas de 1830 e 1840 gerou graves tensões 
sociais. A insegurança da elite e do povo era particularmente evidente nas cidades de 
Recife, Pernambuco, Salvador, Bahia e Rio de Janeiro. Diversos eventos contribuíram 
para a mudança de opinião entre as autoridades e as pessoas comuns no fi nal da década 
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to English in Foreign Oﬃ  ce Records 
13 and 84 are those found in the 
documents. All other translations are 
those of the author.
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Slave resistance and the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade to Brazil in 1850
A debate exists over why the transatlantic slave 
trade ended to Brazil in 1850. One interpretation focu-
ses on the Brazilian government. Th is can described as 
the “Enlightenment School.” Senators, representatives 
and provincial governors maintained close alliance with 
planters and merchants who cultivated sugar, coff ee, 
tobacco, cotton, food crops, and raised swine and cattle. 
A high priority for these men was social stability. Pedro 
II and high-ranking ministers also paid close attention 
to international politics, specifi cally British initiatives to 
halt the slave trade to Brazil.3 Th ey adroitly responded 
to British suppression eff orts in the wake of passage of 
an 1845 measure in England (the Aberdeen Bill) which 
allowed the British Squadron to seize ships seen to be 
involved in the transport of slaves and try them in British 
Admiralty Courts (Needell, 2001; Bethell, 1970; Th omas, 
1997). Th rough this prism, the combined actions of Bra-
zilian statesmen and the British navy brought an end to 
importations of African slaves.
Th e Enlightenment School minimizes social pres-
sures from below, specifi cally slave resistance, as a factor 
in forcing an end to the traffi  c. Fifteen years previous to 
the Eusébio de Queiroz Law which eff ectively outlawed 
the slave trade to Brazil, a slave rebellion broke out in the 
city of Salvador, Bahia that came to be known as the Re-
volt of the Malês (Muslims). Th e Enlightenment School 
contends that the revolt proved to be “inconsequential 
regarding slaveholding in Brazil generally, or in Bahia, at 
least after 1835” (Needell, 2006, p. 146; Mattoso, 1992, 
p. 542). Th e revolt’s minimal impact is affi  rmed by the fact 
that there was no disruption in the transport of African 
slaves to Brazilian shores. 
Historians associated with the Enlightenment 
School believe that memory of that Muslim-led rebellion 
and the huge infl ux of African slaves in its wake had little 
to do with the political decision to halt the traffi  c in 1850. 
One writes that “none of them [what the author labels 
as the ‘reactionaries,’ this being a group of infl uential 
political leaders, including president (governor) of Bahia 
Francisco Gonçalves Martins, minister of foreign aff airs 
Paulino José Soares de Sousa, and minister of justice 
Eusébio de Queiroz] called for the [trans-Atlantic slave] 
trade’s repression out of fear that slavery itself posed a 
fatal security risk” (Needell, 2006, p. 149).
A second perspective on why the slave trade ended 
to Brazil focuses on resistance by slaves and freedpersons 
(libertos). Th is will be described as the “Subaltern School” 
of history. One of its proponents is the Bahian historian 
João José Reis, who has written that “the revolt in Bahia 
[of 1835] caused apprehension in the north and the sou-
th of Brazil, in cities and countryside. Its impact on the 
rest of the nation was immediate, causing authorities in 
Rio de Janeiro [at the Corte, meaning the ministers who 
led the empire] and various local authorities [in several 
provinces] to take actions [to ensure] public security 
and it reinvigorated the debate over [the continuation] 
of the international slave traffi  c [to Brazil] and over the 
institution of slavery”4 (Reis, 2003, p. 509).
Th is essay posits that the Malê Revolt made a 
deep impression on numerous Brazilians, including elite 
and common folk. Memory of the revolt combined with 
various manifestations of slave resistance in its wake 
played a role in shaping imperial politics and decisions 
from 1848 to 1851. It is a key variable that forced a halt 
to the trans-Atlantic slave trade to Brazil at mid-century.
The Malê Revolt, slave resistance, 
and the threats posed by 
importation of African slaves
In the early hours of Sunday, January 25, 1835, 
an estimated six hundred African slaves and freedmen, 
many in white dress worn by Muslims, ran through the 
streets of Salvador shooting guns. Th ey shouted “death to 
the whites” and “death to the soldiers.” For three hours, 
de 1840. A presença da esquadra britânica nos portos e ao longo da costa brasileira 
elevou a resistência entre escravos e libertos. As revoltas de escravos, as conspirações de 
escravos, o medo da religião muçulmana e a desconfi ança dos africanos libertos forçaram 
as autoridades a por um fi m permanente ao tráfi co de escravos.
Palavras-chave: comércio transatlântico de escravos, resistência escrava, Revolta dos 
Malês, libertos africanos.
3 Jeﬀ rey Needell (2006, p. 138-155). Brazilian historians who could be included in this school are Emilia Viotti da Costa (2000, p. 128-132) and Lilia Moritz Schwarcz (1998, p. 297). 
Historians of the nineteenth century whose contributions align with the Enlightenment School include David Brion Davis (1975); Adam Hochschild (2005); Seymour Drescher (1987).
4 Brazilian historians of the “Subaltern School” include Professors João José Reis, Sidney Chalhoub, Robert W. Slenes and Flávio dos Santos Gomes. For perspectives on the debate 
described above, see Chalhoub (2007). An historian of international abolition in the nineteenth century whose perspectives align with this group includes Robin Blackburn, 
1998. I would suggest that Seymour Drescher has a foot in both schools. After decades of research on a wide range of themes, Professor Drescher has embraced slave resistance 
as a key variable in antislavery debates of the nineteenth century. See Drescher (2009).
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they fought against a larger force estimated at fi fteen 
hundred men.5 Th is included police, cavalry, National 
Guard soldiers, and civilians who possessed swords, kni-
ves, clubs and pistols. Th e revolt failed. At least seventy 
rebels died, perhaps double that number were wounded, 
and nine persons lost their lives who fought to put down 
the uprising (Reis, 2003, p. 151-157).
Among the 292 rebels (176 slaves, 112 freedper-
sons, 4 status not known) arrested in the aftermath of 
the revolt, 73 percent were Nagô Africans, a term used 
in Bahia to denote Yoruba people from the present-day 
regions of the Republics of Nigeria and Benin. Given 
that the Nagô represented 30 percent of a total African 
population of 22,000 resident in Salvador in 1835, their 
involvement in the revolt was substantial (Reis, 2003, 
p. 333-334). Numerous Nagô arrived in slave ships to 
Bahia paying homage to Islam; other Nagô slaves and 
freedpersons converted. Perhaps one fi fth (4,400 persons) 
of the African population of Salvador in 1835 were Mus-
lim, a signifi cant portion of these individuals being Nagô 
(Reis, 2003, p. 177). Hence, observers viewed the slave 
revolt as including a substantial Muslim presence among 
its leadership and followers.
Tension reigned in Salvador in the aftermath of the 
uprising. Writing a day after the Malê Revolt, a French 
consul stationed in Salvador commented that “the agglo-
meration in Bahia of negroes of the Nagô nation places at 
all moments this province in danger [of slave rebellion] 
due the perfect unanimity of language, of desires, of 
displeasure and hatred that joins these men together in 
unity, [men who are] intelligent, strong and courageous” 
(Reis, 2003, p. 335, author’s emphasis). One week later, 
rumor spread of an impending attack on Salvador by a 
group of “mulattos and blacks” residing in the Red River 
(Rio Vermelho) neighborhood a short distance to the north 
of the city. Th e governor of the province issued orders to 
prepare for another uprising. “Bahia seemed to be in a 
state of siege. Th e consternation was universal. Natives 
and foreigners were summoned to arm. Great were the 
preparations.”6 To protect the house of a United States 
citizen, the captain of the US corvette Erie landed United 
States Marines on shore. Two days later, British residents 
found solace with the arrival of the vessel of war HMS 
North Star into the Bay of All Saints.7
Bahian authorities were quick to respond. Th e 
provincial government sent to Africa at public expense 
one ship with 150 “free Africans” on board. Of this group 
police labeled 120 African freedpersons as “suspected 
persons.” Th e other 30 were liberated Africans removed 
from captured slave vessels by the British Squadron and 
residing in Salvador.8 Owners deported another 380 
African slaves to other provinces of Brazil. Of these, 
136 were Nagô. By the end of 1835, at least 700 African 
freedpersons received passports to allow departure from 
Bahia. Offi  cials facilitated this emigration by speeding 
the applications through the bureaucracy (Reis, 2003, 
p. 482-483, 491-492).
Tensions remained high for well over a year. In the 
annual speech to open the Provincial Assembly in early 
March 1836, Bahia’s president noted that “signs have 
been observed and rumors constantly spread by which 
the public mind, not yet recovered from the Alarms of 
January 1835, has been considerably disturbed.” President 
Francisco de Souza Paraiso affi  rmed that the deportations 
of free Africans during the previous months had caused 
“the apprehension of immediate insurrection to be less 
apparent.” He also stated that “as long as these barbarians 
[African slaves and African free persons], our necessary 
enemies, shall exist among us, they will never desist from 
their dark designs, notwithstanding they may always fi nd 
them fruitless and abortive.” His warning mixed contempt 
for the “barbarians” with assurance that the enemy would 
never become a threat. 
It is important to read closely the president’s 
words. Fifteen months after the Revolt of the Malês, 
Paraiso remained focused on public insecurity. He re-
quested that African slaves found guilty of participation 
in the insurrection be expelled from Bahia. And he 
was deeply concerned about the continuation of slave 
importations.
It is therefore expedient to pay increasing attention to 
this subject [another slave insurrection], and to adopt 
every means that may contribute to our safety. Besides 
which, it appears to me very urgent that some measures 
should be adopted with respect to such African slaves as 
may become dangerous and suspected, especially concer-
ning those [who participated] in the last insurrection 
[ January 1835], and who were found guilty by the 
Jury, in order that they may not continue to live in the 
midst of us—and that their owners should be obliged 
to sell them, to be sent out of the province.
5 Parkinson to Wellington, Salvador, January 29, 1835, Foreign Oﬃ  ce Records of Great Britain Number 13: General Correspondence from Brazil before 1906, microﬁ lm number 
121 (hereafter FO 13).
6 Parkinson to Wellington, Salvador, February 2, 1835 (FO 13:121).
7 Parkinson to Wellington, Salvador, March 3, 1835 (FO 13:121).
8 Extract of the President of Bahia opening the Provincial Assembly in March 1836, included in Jackson to Palmerston, Rio de Janeiro, March 1, 1836, Foreign Oﬃ  ce Records of 
Great Britain Number 84: Slave Trade, microﬁ lm number 198 (hereafter FO 84).
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Th e contraband of slaves continues with the same 
scandal, and hitherto none of the parties, or abettors, 
of such an abominable and pernicious trade has been 
punished. Impunity attends almost every sort of crime, 
sometimes no prosecution at all being instituted, and 
at others being so conducted that the criminal is not 
put on his trial, or should he be, he fi nds ready means 
of defense, so as to be acquitted by the jury.9
As part of the government’s response to the Malê 
Revolt, the provincial assembly suspended individual gua-
rantees and allowed police to search homes belonging to 
free Africans.10 So began a systematic campaign by police 
and politicians against African freedpersons and Muslims 
that continued for at least two decades (1835 to mid-
1850s). Police in Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, and Recife (and 
likely in other locales) confi scated all sorts of documents 
and materials in their quest to stamp out the perceived 
threat posed by what two Brazilian historians have termed 
“Malê contamination”11 (Soares and Gomes, 2001).
A question posed is if the Malê Revolt in Salvador 
made such an impression, why did the traffi  c continue? 
Within days of the revolt, traffi  ckers disembarked some 
one thousand enslaved Africans in the immediate vicinity 
of Salvador.12 In the years that followed, disembarkations 
continued at a torrid pace. Th e numbers are staggering: 
traffi  ckers landed an estimated 718,000 African slaves on 
Brazilian coasts from November 7, 1831 (passage of the 
Brazilian law which made the importation of slaves illegal 
and declared free any slave imported after this date) until 
suppression in 1851. Professor Needell writes that “the 
era between 1838 and 1849 was the era when, contraband 
or no, most captives were sold in Brazil on a per annum 
basis in the whole history of the Atlantic slave trade. How 
terrifi ed of Africans could the slaveholders have been if they 
bought them with such eagerness?” (Needell, 2006, p. 148).
One response would be that planters needed 
workers to cultivate their crops. Given a dearth of free 
workers willing to labor on farms and few immigrants 
arriving from Europe or other locales, planters remained 
dependent on slaves to produce goods. Capitalists had 
signifi cant investments in land and machinery. Owners of 
estates believed that any interruption of slave importations 
placed their livelihood in jeopardy. 
Th e merchant-planter elite rejected the proposition 
that a slave revolt in Salvador quickly snuff ed out by the 
police ought to derail a steady fl ow of African slaves. As 
in other instances since the rise of international capitalism 
in the fi fteenth century, short-term economic benefi ts 
marginalized concerns about the future. Furthermore, 
traffi  ckers and their allies had the means to pay diverse 
individuals (provincial governors, police, judges, juries, 
inhabitants on the coast, custom house offi  cials, port 
workers, private militias, ship captains and crews, foreign 
consuls) to assure the continuation of slave importations.13
By the mid-1840s, numerous individuals recog-
nized that British actions, which included the seizure of 
slave vessels by the British Navy, might cause a permanent 
interruption in slave importations to Brazil. Th is percep-
tion added to the urgency exhibited at this juncture to 
transport as many African slaves as possible to Brazil. 
Hence, internal and external variables contributed 
to a seemingly insatiable demand for slaves in the fi fteen 
years that followed 1835.
Diverse observers after the 1835 slave revolt in 
Salvador viewed the continued slave disembarkations 
with trepidation, if not terror. Within days of the uprising, 
newspapers in Rio de Janeiro alluded to dangers ahead. 
A journalist writing in the prestigious Jornal do Comércio 
emphasized that the slave trade should be viewed as “an 
element of discordance and of future perturbations” (Jornal 
do Commercio, no. 37, February 17, 1835, in Reis, 2003, 
p. 517) Less than a month later, the newspaper Aurora 
Fluminense included the dire comments made by the 
president of Bahia at the opening of the Bahian Provin-
cial Assembly: “Every slave disembarked on our beaches 
is a fresh barrel of gunpowder thrown into a mine shaft, 
the explosion of which is capable of producing horrifi c 
results.”14
At the end of March, British envoy Henry S. 
Fox wrote that “the terror that is spreading far and wide 
through Brazil, since the late insurrection of the blacks 
at Bahia, has rendered the present moment favorable for 
this government to improve and strengthen the anti-slave 
trade legislation. Th e eyes of most men are beginning to 
be opened, if not to the infamy of slave dealing, at least 
to the enormous danger of allowing fresh multitudes of 
Africans, under any condition, to be poured daily into the 
9 Extract of the President of Bahia opening the Provincial Assembly in March 1836, included in Jackson to Palmerston, Rio de Janeiro, March 1, 1836 (FO 84: 198).
10 Francisco de Souza Martins to Frederick Robilliard, Salvador, March 28, 1835 (FO 13:121).
11 Chief of Police Evaristo Fernando d’Argollo to President Tomás Xavier Garcia de Almeida, Salvador, July 26, 1839, Public Archive of the State of Bahia: Colonial and Provincial 
Section, maço 2949 (hereafter APEB/SACP); Chief of Police Antonio Simõens da Silva to Minister of Justice Eusébio de Queiroz, Rio de Janeiro, March 26, 1849, National Archives 
in Rio de Janeiro, Secretary of the Police in the Corte, IJ 6 212 (hereafter ANRJ/Polícia).
12 Parkinson to Wellington, Salvador, January 29, 1835 (FO 13:121).
13 Parkinson to Wellington, Salvador, January 29, 1835 (FO 13:121); W.G. Ouseley, Notes on the subject of the slave trade in the province and city of Bahia, September 1835. 
This was sent from Ouseley to Fox, Rio, October 27, 1835 (FO 84:179). See also The Yacht Maria Até Ver, O Século, October 3, 1850, translated in Porter to Hudson, Salvador, 
October 9, 1850 (FO 84:807).
14 Aurora Fluminense, March 20, 1835 (p. 3818). The Assembly convened on March 1, 1835.
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country.”15 Two months later, Fox continued in this vein: 
“I have observed with satisfaction that in all documents 
and declarations proceeding from the authority of the 
Government, the slave trade now denounced and conde-
mned, not only as was heretofore frequently the language, 
from motives of abstract benevolence and philanthropy, 
or out of deference to the wishes of foreign nations, but 
as a manifest, acknowledged cause of monstrous, practical 
evil, and of immediate pressing danger to the existence of 
the white people of Brazil.”16
In May 1835, the Provincial Assembly of Bahia 
sent a letter to the General Legislative Assembly of Bra-
zil meeting in Rio de Janeiro. Signed by the president 
and archbishop of Bahia along with the fi rst and second 
secretaries of the assembly, this communiqué called for 
a halt to the trans-Atlantic slave trade from Africa, and 
the coastal transport of African slaves previously landed in 
Argentina and Uruguay to Brazil. “Th e illicit importation 
of millions of barbarians, which with the most shameful 
scandal is still practiced in our ports, is doubtless more 
fatal to our morals, our security and prosperity, than the 
spirit of insurrection and rebellion [responsible for] the 
disastrous event on January 25 of the present year [1835]. 
Th e incessant recruitment of new Africans augments 
the number and the audacity of the slaves and freedmen 
who exist among us.”17 Such concerns continued to be 
expressed through the 1840s and early 1850s.
As in Europe, 1848 proved to be a tumultuous year 
in Brazil. President of Bahia João de Moura Magalhães 
claimed that “I am writing truthfully, providing exact in-
formation of what is happening in this province. We need 
prompt and energetic measures to prevent insurrections 
by Africans. Everyone still remembers what happened 
in 1835, [a revolt] that would have produced far greater 
destruction, if it had not been promptly annihilated.”18 
British consul Henry Cowper echoed this view: “A general 
apprehension exists in the province of Bahia that the ex-
tension of the slave trade is hastening the day when that 
province will fall into the hands of blacks.”19
On February 4, police in the town of Pelotas, 
Rio Grande do Sul (southernmost province) learned 
of plans for a slave uprising to occur the next day. An 
estimated 1,500 slaves from six estates were believed 
to be involved in the conspiracy. Investigations unco-
vered 200 muskets, 200 carbines, swords, pistols and 
ammunition stored at a farmhouse. Police arrested 300 
and “severely fl ogged” several of the accused; ten died 
from the beatings.20 As in the 1835 Revolt of the Malês, 
information provided by Africans previous to the upri-
sing proved helpful to authorities. A British diplomat 
present noted that “the informers of the existence of 
this conspiracy are three Mina slaves who, feeling great 
friendship for their masters, who had always treated 
them kindly, confessed the whole plan to them, and 
thus most providentially prevented the scenes of St. 
Domingo in this province.”21
In his description of this horrifi c episode, British 
consul Lord Howden wrote:
Th e Slaves implicated in this plot are exclusively nati-
ves of Mina and come from the North of the Line, to 
the east of Cape Coast [present day Ghana, Togo, Be-
nin and western Nigeria] (Law, 2005). Th is race is the 
same that prepared the nearly successful insurrection 
of Bahia in 1835; and the slaves belonging to it are 
entirely and most remarkably diff erent from all other 
Africans in Brazil both physically and intellectually. 
Th ese Mina slaves all speak the same language, have 
organized societies and elected chiefs wherever they 
meet in any numbers, are remarkable for their habits 
of order, their serious and dignifi ed deportment, their 
economy, their prevision, and their sullen courage; and 
they are corporeally the fi nest specimens of the human 
race I ever saw. It is said that the inhabitants of the 
province of Rio de Janeiro, afraid of the slumbering 
energies of such men, buy them unwillingly; and, in 
fact, but comparatively few of this easily distingui-
shed race are to be seen in the Capital [city of Rio de 
Janeiro]. I have no doubt but that this is the People 
charged by Providence with the dreadful and inevi-
table retribution of Africa.22
Slaves from the Mina coast had gained a repu-
tation of rebelliousness from north to south in Brazil. 
Howden’s observations suggest that offi  cials in Rio de 
Janeiro had sent out of the city African slaves and fre-
edpersons who had arrived from Salvador in the years 
that followed the 1835 Revolt. Th is measure was taken 
15 Fox to Wellington, Rio de Janeiro, March 25, 1835 (FO 84:179).
16 Fox to Wellington, Rio de Janeiro, May 30, 1835 (FO 13:117).
17 Representation of the Provincial Assembly of Bahia to the General Legislative Assembly in Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, May 11, 1835 (FO 84:175).
18 Magalhães to Minister of Justice, Salvador, February 9, 1848, National Archives of Brazil in Rio de Janeiro: Section of Executive Powers, IJ 1 710 (hereafter ANRJ/SPE). For further 
analysis of this period, see Graden (2006, p. 33-42).
19 Cowper to Palmerston, Recife, February 19, 1848 (FO 84:727).
20 Morgan to Howden, Pelotas, February 9, 1848 (FO 84:727); Morgan to Palmerston, Rio Grande do Sul, February 15, 1848 (FO 84:727).
21 Morgan to Howden, Pelotas, February 9, 1848 (FO 84:727).
22 Howden to Palmerston, Rio de Janeiro, March 20, 1848 (FO 84:725).
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to prevent slave resistance in the city of Rio de Janeiro 
(Soares and Gomes, 2001, p. 346).
In the Center-South provinces of Brazil, a major 
slave conspiracy coalesced on several coff ee plantations in 
the Valley of Paraíba that extends from the province of 
Rio de Janeiro into São Paulo. Th e plan had its origins in 
Bantu spirituality and knowledge of the suppression of 
the traffi  c to Brazil by the British Squadron. In the “Secret 
Reportof the Select Committee of the Provincial Assembly 
of Rio de Janeiro on Secret Societies of Africans in the 
Province of Rio de Janeiro,” the authors wrote that looking 
“upon the situation in the country, the very small number of 
white men in relation with the millions of slaves who abound 
in all parts [and] the insuffi  ciency and impropriety of 
our criminal legislation, the special commission cannot 
but recognize the impossibility of at once calming the 
apprehension of an insurrection of the slaves.” The 
president of São Paulo requested that the same report be 
evaluated by the legislative assembly of his province.
Based on interrogations of jailed slaves and in-
telligence gleaned from police offi  cials, the committee 
pointed to the existence of an extensive African Society 
with members in the city of Rio de Janeiro and in the 
interior of the province. Th e Society was divided into 
“circles” composed of fi fty slaves, each headed by a chief 
known as a Taté who had six assistants named Cam-
bondos. Th e word Taté perhaps has origins in the word 
Pajé, meaning the chief of an indigenous tribe in Brazil. 
More likely Taté is derived from the Bantu language 
Kimbundu spoken in the Congo and Angola regions of 
Africa. Taté is a variant of the word Tateto, which means 
father. In African Brazilian religious ceremonies known 
as Candomblé, those infl uenced by Angolan culture are 
led by a father of a saint (pai-de-santo) who is known as 
“Tateto ti inkice” or “Tateto t’inkice.” In relation to the 
African Society believed to exist in the province of Rio de 
Janeiro, Taté would imply leader or chief. A Cambondo 
is most likely a variant of the word “Cambono,” a term 
used to describe a participant at a Candomblé ceremony 
who provided assistance to persons under the spell of a 
divine force. Th is often entailed embracing and protec-
ting the possessed as the orixá (divinity) passed through 
his or her body. Th e Cambondos included males known 
as Filhos do Terreiro (sons of a house of Candomblé) 
and three or four African females known as Mocambas 
do Anjo. Sons of a terreiro were men associated with a 
particular house where Candomblé ceremonies occurred. 
Use of the word Mocamba perhaps suggested that these 
African females gained their strength and character from 
experience in escaped slave communities (mocambos). Or 
it might have its origins in the word mucamba, a term 
used by owners in the nineteenth century to denote a 
female domestic slave. Th e investigating committee of 
the Provincial Assembly of Rio de Janeiro viewed the 
Mocambas do Anjo (angel-like female Africans) as 
particularly dangerous, as they were domestic slaves who 
resided in close proximity to their owners. 
Th e plan included the poisoning of “masters of 
whatever sex or age” along with the assassination of “ad-
ministrators and other free people employed on the estates 
including those slaves who wished to remain faithful to 
their masters.”23 Tensions reached such a pitch that slave 
owners and their families fearful of rebellious slaves 
abandoned their estates in the interior of São Paulo and 
fl ed to towns. Historian Robert W. Slenes opines that the 
public insecurity and tensions fomented by the “foreigners 
from Africa” had as much to do with forcing an end to the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade to Brazil as British initiatives 
(Slenes, 2000, p. 218-219; Gomes, 1995, p. 262).
In a communiqué penned in August, British di-
plomat James Hudson attempted to put a positive spin 
on the situation. Hudson concluded that the unceasing 
importations of African slaves to Brazilian shores had 
caused a shift in opinion among high-ranking offi  cials in 
Brazil. “A very satisfactory change appears to be taking 
place in the mind of the Brazilian government and public, 
upon the subject of the importation of slaves, due to the 
eff ect, I think, of Lord Aberdeen’s bill [1845], [which 
enabled] the captures to be made under it; to the terror 
which the late enormous importation of slaves has created in 
this government, and in the thinking part of the community; 
and in the isolated position in which Brazil now stands 
on this continent and in Europe, where she has lost the 
hold on both France and Austria.”24
In spite of a steady stream of warnings, traffi  ckers 
continued to disembark thousands of African slaves in the 
cities of Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, Santos (province of São 
Paulo) and on remote beaches and islands nearby. Indeed, 
the largest number of enslaved Africans to disembark in 
Brazil or any other region of the Americas in the history 
of the transatlantic trade occurred in 1848. Th e peak for 
two years was 1848-1849, and the peak triennium was 
1847-1849 (Drescher, 2009, p. 291).
Th e Municipal Corporation (Council) of Salvador 
articulated their trepidation concerning the arrival of so 
many Africans in mid-1850.
23 F.S. Dias da Motta and José Alves Carneiro Montezuma, Rio de Janeiro, July 8, 1848: Secret Report of the Select Committee of the Provincial Assembly of Rio de Janeiro on Secret 
Societies of Africans in the Province of Rio de Janeiro, July 8, 1848 [Assembly House in Secret Session, July 8, 1848]. This document is translated in Hudson to Palmerston, Rio 
de Janeiro, February 20, 1850 (FO 84:802).
24 Hudson to Palmerston, Rio de Janeiro, August 5, 1848 (FO 84:726). Author’s emphasis.
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Th e traffi  c in slaves is nowadays tolerated in this second 
city of Brazil in a most reprehensible manner. Th ere is 
not one person here who, looking at the vessels lying at 
anchor in the port, cannot distinguish those destined to 
proceed on that piracy; there is not one person here who 
does not know the Houses, called stations, in which raw 
(boçaes) Africans [meaning newly-arrived] are kept for 
sale, within the limits of this municipality, even in this 
city. Th ere is not any one person who cannot name those 
who have taken part in this barbarous and illicit traffi  c. 
Th e Law of 7th November 1831 is therefore disrespected 
and scorned, and the traffi  c is carried on with greater 
ease inasmuch as it is principally in the hands of stran-
gers, who have come to Brazil to make their fortunes, 
and to take possession of our national commerce.
No one who seriously refl ects upon the future interests 
of Brazil, in whose veins the blood of free men fl ows, 
or whose understanding is acquainted with the sacred 
tenets of the Christian religion, can be indiff erent to 
this heap of combustibles, which is accumulating against 
Brazilian society, subjecting us to continual alarm and 
barbarous insurrections; nor can the Municipal Cham-
ber of Bahia, therefore, view them with indiff erence.25
Adding to fears during these years was the historical 
memory of the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) (Dubois, 
2004; Fick, 1990; Geggus, 2001; Landers, 2010, p. 55-94). 
Several documents from 1835 through 1850 express con-
cern that if the importations were to continue, “another 
Haiti” could occur in Brazil. In March 1835, a letter sent 
from the provincial assembly of the province of Rio de 
Janeiro to imperial ministers stated that “Th ese apprehen-
sions, sire, are not groundless. Everyone knows that the 
doctrines of Hayti are here preached with impunity, that 
the slaves are allured with the bait of Liberty and urged on 
by excited spirits, National as well as Foreign, within and 
without the Empire, to break out into commotions of which 
those of Bahia are furnishing the most fatal example.”26
In speeches on the fl oor of the imperial Senate in Rio 
de Janeiro during 1843, Senator Antônio Pedro da Costa 
Ferreira from the province of Maranhão alluded to Haiti’s 
past. A lawyer and planter, he reprehended colleagues disinte-
rested in halting the slave trade. Ferreira noted that Africans 
had been transported to St. Domingue after the indigenous 
people had been exterminated. With the Haitian Revolution, 
“the victimizers [owners] became the victims […] Don’t you 
still see the smoke of [rising from] the sacrifi ced victims in 
Haiti? Do you consider it possible to conceive of security in 
Brazil with that [huge] population [of slaves]?”27 Th e senator 
continued: “I have fear with regards to future dangers, and I 
seek to avoid [prevent; evitar] them. Far from accepting the 
erroneous idea that the agricultural sector in Brazil will be 
destroyed by a lack of African slaves, we must show that a 
country worked by slaves is never happy. Such a system only 
brings bad outcomes [só acarreta males sobre si].”28
In mid-1850, a journalist writing in Recife echoed 
similar sentiments. During the previous decade, traffi  -
ckers had landed several thousand African slaves in the 
port of Recife or nearby locales. “Let our government 
hang legally half a dozen of these slave dealers, shame 
and opprobrium of humanity, let it not permit one more 
slave to be introduced into our territory, let it make all 
sacrifi ces to develop a colonization of free hands, off er to 
them all the guarantees as is done in the United States, 
and let it be certain that only in this manner can it avoid 
that earlier or later we must have in Brazil a new Santo 
Domingo [another Haitian Revolution].”29
Insecurity at mid-century
How do we measure the extent of the threat posed 
to national security caused by the slave importations from 
1835 through late 1850? To what extent did fear or terror 
caused by slave resistance contribute to the decisions of 
imperial ministers in 1850 to force a permanent halt to 
the slave traffi  c to Brazil? Sure answers to these questions 
are hard to come by. What is clear is that numerous ar-
ticulate observers remembered well the 1835 slave revolt 
in Salvador, expressed concern about slave rebellion and 
resistance, and considered the importations of African 
slaves after 1835 a signifi cant threat to the stability of port 
cities, rural areas and even the empire itself. Documents 
found in Brazilian archives provide insights in this regard. 
Th ree examples are noted.
Th e fi rst is a slave revolt that occurred in the provin-
ce of Espírito Santo. In the afternoon of March 19, 1849, 
a group of thirty or more armed slaves joined together in 
insurrection in the district of Queimado, situated some 12 
miles (3 to 4 leguas) outside the capital city of Victoria. 
A region where hundreds of slaves labored on coff ee and 
sugar estates, the revolt was led by three male slaves each 
25 Representação sobre of tráﬁ co, from the Municipal Corporation of the city of Salvador to the General Assembly in Rio de Janeiro, published in Correio Mercantil (Rio de Janeiro), 
August 3, 1850 (FO 84:806).
26 Message from the Provincial Assembly of Rio de Janeiro to the Imperial Government, Palace of the Legislative Assembly, March 17, 1835 (FO 84:174). See also Fox to Wel-
lington, Rio de Janeiro, April 13, 1835 (FO 13:117); Parkinson to Wellington, Salvador, January 26, 1835 (FO 13:121).
27 Session of March 27, 1843, Annals of the Senate of Brazil (hereafter cited as ASIB), p. 411-13; Session of June 10, 1843 (ASIB, p. 413).
28 Session of March 27, 1843 (ASIB, p. 413).
29 Commercial (Recife), May 31, 1850 (FO 84:809).
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owned by a diff erent planter. Th e number of slaves who 
joined in the rebellion quickly increased to 300. Shouting 
that “We demand our Freedom” and “We demand Letters 
of Manumission” [carta de manumissão, an offi  cial document 
that defi ned one’s status as a free person], they also seized 
arms and ammunition at various estates. Th e event caused 
“terror” among the inhabitants around the region and in 
Victoria. Th e president of Espírito Santo warned that wi-
thout an adequate police presence, similar upheavals could 
easily spread to other provinces in the empire.30
In response, offi  cials sent out twenty men to put 
down the revolt, this patrol known as the Permanent 
Company of Hunters (Companhia Fixa de Caçadores). 
Confronted by superior force and a lack of arms, the 
majority of the escaped slaves fl ed into nearby forests. 
Within two days the revolt was fi nished.31 By the end of 
the month, thirty of the insurrectionists had been arrested 
and put in prison to await their fate. Numerous others 
returned to the properties from which they had fl ed. In 
describing this event, the chief of police expressed little 
surprise at what had occurred. He wrote that “it is gene-
rally known that the slaves of our province are in a state of 
unhappiness [desmoralização, suggesting that the slaves are 
resisting the coercion and controls imposed by owners].”32 
In her description of the “Insurrection at Queima-
do,” Brazilian historian Vilma Paraíso Ferreira de Almada 
emphasizes that the outbreak was but one example in a 
long history of slave resistance in the province. During the 
1820s and 1830s, slaves showed themselves to be closely 
attuned to all news related to their condition (for exam-
ple the law of November 7, 1831). Quoting Trinidadian 
historian Eric Williams, Almada agrees that “Not nearly 
as stupid as his master thought him and later historians 
have pictured him, the slave was alert to surroundings and 
keenly interested in discussions about his fate” (Almada, 
1984, p. 168; Williams, 1980, p. 202).
Slaves residing in the capital city of Victoria and the 
interior of the province of Espírito Santo maintained close 
contact with an Atlantic World that provided them infor-
mation and inspiration (Schama, 2006, p. 66; Landers, 2010, 
p. 5). British actions at sea and the statements of planters 
and offi  cials (discussions at the dinner table, newspaper articles, 
political discourse, etc.) related to suppression of the slave trade 
infl uenced the slaves at Queimado. Offi  cials reacted quickly 
to ensure the insurrection did not spread. In the words of 
Professor Almada, “the fear that always existed among the 
owners shifted into panic [from the late 1840s], given that the 
slaves, inspired by [this] abolitionist conjuncture, principally 
those in the plantation regions, refused to remain submissive 
and became increasingly fearless” (Almada, 1984, p. 172-173).
A review of several hundred documents from the 
period 1835 to 1851 provides numerous descriptions of 
slave revolts and organized slave resistance, including “te-
nacious” fi ghting by escaped slaves hiding in forests. Th ese 
episodes occurred in the provinces of Maranhão, Pará, 
Alagoas, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro (and likely others).33 
Such events fueled tensions at mid-century.
A second example of insecurity by the end of the 
1840s focuses on African freedpersons residing in the city 
of Salvador. Th ese were former slaves who had gained their 
freedom, often by saving money from their labor and pur-
chasing a manumission card. Based on investigations car-
ried out in the fi rst months of 1847, police published a list 
of 2,508 African freedpersons residing in the ten parishes 
of the city. Of these, 993 were male and 1,515 female.34 
Using an estimate for the total population of the city of 
54,330, freedpersons made up 4.6% of the inhabitants of 
Salvador, and slaves another 25% (or 13,600 persons, a 
conservative estimate)35 (Nascimento, 1986, p. 65).
African freedpersons are commonly depicted as 
having little interest in disrupting the status quo. Professor 
Needell believes that “despite the fact of a common white 
oppression, [in Brazil] Africans and Afro-Brazilians did 
not rise up [together] along Haitian lines. Th ose whose 
skills and knowledge were, potentially, the most apt for 
leadership in a rebellion, were, in reality, the least likely to 
challenge the established racialized hierarchy” (Needell, 
2006, p. 143). Th e above document which noted the home 
parish and employment of each freedperson in Salvador 
would appear to confi rm such an interpretation. Th e police 
offi  cial responsible for summing up the fi ndings pointed 
out that freedpersons resident in the city owned at least 
600 slaves, implying that possession of such property made 
them an unlikely threat to the slave regime.
However, a closer reading of the documents sheds 
helpful light on the social tensions at mid-century. Afri-
can freedpersons had played a key role in the Revolt of 
the Malês in 1835. In the months and years that followed, 
30 Antonio Joaquim de Siqueira to Minister of Interior Visconde de Monte Alegre, Victoria, March 20, 1849 (ANRJ/SPE, IJJ 9 362).
31 Siqueira to Alegre, Victoria, March 24, 1849 (ANRJ/SPE, IJJ 9 362).
32 Chief of Police José Ignácio Accioli de Vasconcellos to President Siqueira, Victoria, March 23, 1849 (ANRJ/SPE, IJJ 9 362).
33 President of Maranhão (illegible) to Minister of Interior Manoel Antonio Galvão, Maranhão, December 30, 1839 (ANRJ/SPE IJJ 9 133); President of Pará Manoel Paranhos da Silva 
Vellozo to Minister of Justice, Pará, January 28, 1846, (ANRJ/SPE, IJ 1 202); President of Alagoas Bernardo de Sousa Franco to Galvão, Alagoas, November 19, 1844 (ANRJ/SPE, 
IJ 1 357); President Joaquim Vasconcelos to Minister of Justice, Bahia, December 14, 1841 (ANRJ/SPE, IJ 1 399); Comandante das Armas José Joaquim Coelho to President Fran-
cisco Martins, Salvador, October 23, 1848 (ANRJ/SPE, IG 1 119); Francisco Pereira de Vasconcellos to Minister of Justice Eusebio de Queiroz, Rio de Janerio, December 16, 1851 
(ANRJ/Polícia, IJ 6 215); Police Delegate Roberto Jorge Haddock to Chief of Police Antonio Simoens da Silva, Rio de Janeiro, June 13 and June 15, 1849 (ANRJ/Polícia, IJ 6 212).
34 Mappa demonstrativo do numero de Africanos libertos n’esta cidade com declaração do negocio em que se empregão. Salvador, March 20, 1847 (ANRJ/SPE, IJ 1 403).
35 The 1855 census notes a total population in Salvador of 56,000, with 68.9% free (38,584), 27.5% slave (15,400) and 3.5% freedpersons (2,016), as noted on p. 97.
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they suff ered systematic reprisals. Several hundred were 
deported, others departed from Bahia on their own will, 
and several were thrown into prison on the fl imsiest of 
evidence. By early 1847, fear had mounted dramatically 
in both city and countryside (Graden, 1996).
Apprehension is readily evident in a letter penned 
by the president of Bahia Antonio Inácio de Azevedo soon 
after the police had concluded their work. “I consider the 
estimate of 2,508 African freedpersons to be low, given 
that such records are not always exact. Nevertheless, that 
number [the substantial presence], along with the [high] 
number of slaves present, justify the fears that now and 
then surface, and [make understandable] the actions I have 
taken to bring troops here [to Salvador] capable of putting 
down any sort of an insurrection which might occur.”36 A 
survey by police of African freedpersons resident in Salva-
dor should be evaluated in light of the historical moment. 
Th e elite of Bahia had not forgotten the involvement of 
African freedpersons in the Revolt of the Malês, and they 
remained deeply distrustful of free Africans in their midst. 
Tensions provoked by the presence of free Africans 
(freedpersons and liberated Africans) in Salvador did not 
quickly diminish. On May 8, 1853, rumor spread of an 
impending slave insurrection. Th rough the night soldiers 
on horseback patrolled the streets and the infantry was 
placed on full alert. British consul James Hudson wrote that
it is reported that arms and ammunition were found 
secreted in the houses of some liberated Africans of the 
Nagó or Minas nation, as well as fl ags and masque-
rading dresses such as were displayed by them in the 
last great insurrection in the year 1835.
Th e jails are full of free Africans and the domiciliary 
visits of the police are deplorable. I however believe the 
apprehension entertained by the provincial government 
is much greater than the facts seem to justify, and that 
the opportunity is taken to oblige the liberated blacks to 
return to Africa without their possessing the means of 
doing so, but which the government by law and by every 
principle of justice are bound to do at their own expense.
Th is will only show your Lordship how great the 
curse is to which all are subjected by the insecurity 
of life resulting from the awful state of slavery of so 
many thousands of our fellow creatures in this large 
slave holding province, where, at stated periods, an 
insurrection is generally expected.37
Although Hudson downplayed the extent of the 
threat, obviously Bahian police and offi  cials viewed the 
situation with trepidation. Using force to break into 
houses, they carried out searches and arrested suspicious 
Africans. In the weeks that followed, the president of Ba-
hia invoked a law passed in May 1835 in response to the 
“very peculiar circumstances of this province with regards 
to the terrible danger of insurrection.” Provincial law num-
ber nine stipulated that foreign ships departing from Salva-
dor destined for Africa or nearby accept Africans deported 
by the provincial authorities as passengers (Graden, 2006, 
p. 42-43). Knowing that Bahian authorities would look to 
vessels from their nations as potential conduits, the Dutch 
and British consuls both penned protests.
A third demonstration of insecurity at mid-century 
occurred in the city of Recife. In late September 1847 a 
British consul wrote that “persecution of a black religious 
sect has progressed so considerably [since late 1846] that 
the populace burnt the house of the Apostle and would 
have destroyed him also if he had not escaped.”38 Given 
the presence of Muslims who met regularly in private 
homes in Recife and the use of the word Apostle, this 
violence most likely was directed at Islamic ceremonies 
and participants.
Six years later, in early September 1853, police 
arrested several Africans accused of organizing “a new 
religious sect” under the leadership of a Muslim African 
freedman named João Rufi no (Gomes et al., 2004). Ma-
terials confi scated from their homes included a Koran 
and “many sheets of paper written in Hebraic [Hebrew, 
but in fact the words were in Arabic].” News of the ar-
rests provoked alarm that Muslims were planning a slave 
revolt. Th e chief of police in Recife sent one of the Arabic 
documents to Rio de Janeiro for translation. Preserved at 
the National Archives of Brazil, the letter proved to be 
a statement of marriage vows, and appears to have had 
nothing to do with rebellion.39 Th is episode suggests that 
police and the upper class of Recife remembered well 
the events of Salvador in 1835. To prevent the outbreak 
of another slave insurrection, offi  cials sought to prevent 
the spread to Recife of Islamic subversion (Soares and 
Gomes, 2001, p. 346; Graden, 2006, p. 29).
What did fears of slave insurrection, the round-up 
of African slaves and freedpersons, and the confi scation of 
materials in September 1853 have to do with the decision 
to put an end to the trans-Atlantic slave trade in early 
1850? Everything. Events often play out as the result of 
past history; milieu and experience often shape outcome. 
36 President of Bahia Antonio Inácio de Azevedo to Minister of Justice Joaquim Fernando Torres, Salvador, April 6, 1847 (ANRJ/SPE, IJ 1 403).
37 Morgan to Clarendon, Salvador, May 13, 1853 (FO 84:912).
38 Cowper to Palmerston, Recife, September 30, 1847 (FO 84: 679).
39 Alexandre Joaquim (illegible) to Minister of Justice, Recife, Pernambuco, October 5, 1853 (ANRJ/Polícia, IJ 6 216).
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Th e arrests of Africans in Salvador and Recife 
occurred because of continued distrust of “free Africans” 
(Africanos livres). This designation included African 
freedpersons and liberated Africans. Fear was further 
heightened because some free Africans practiced Islam. 
Even though the number of practicing Muslim African 
slaves and freedmen residing in Brazil had diminished 
signifi cantly by mid-century, the number of Nagô who 
arrived from West Africa remained high. Indeed, João 
Reis describes the Nagô as having “a spectacular presence 
at mid-century” among the slave population of Salvador 
(Reis, 2003, p. 334). In the minds of the Salvador and Re-
cife police, a Nagô African could likely be a Muslim. All of 
these factors created anxieties which offi  cials throughout 
the empire hoped might be diminished by slowing down 
if not halting the number of African slaves entering Brazil.
Statements by observers, articles written by jour-
nalists, the communiqués of provincial offi  cials and the 
studies of several historians suggest that fears of slave 
uprisings and unceasing slave resistance combined with 
massive slave disembarkations infl uenced imperial offi  cials 
to put a stop to the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 1850.
The debates of 1850
Th e Enlightenment School affi  rms that ministers 
in the cabinet of the imperial government decided to 
end slave importations in January 1850 based on politi-
cal considerations. In successfully putting down several 
federalist revolts and consolidating centralized rule under 
the monarchy, they had gained the confi dence of the 
merchant-planter elite. Astute observers of the world 
around them, the ministers viewed themselves as having 
been eff ective leaders during the previous two decades. 
Sensitive to British pressures, they recognized that conti-
nued slave importations did not bode well for the empire 
in terms of international opinion or for maintaining their 
positions of authority. Th is depiction discounts insecurity 
caused by slave resistance as a motive for their actions 
(Needell, 2006, p. 139-149).
Th e above portrayal has several fl aws. Not only 
did these ministers have lots of experience in politics, but 
they had dealt for many years with African and creole 
slaves. Th ey understood that various strategies had to be 
employed on a daily basis to maintain control over slaves. 
Th is included both coercion and negotiation (Reis and 
Silva, 1989). Th ey knew well the arrival of thousands 
of Africans had caused the Haitian Revolution and the 
Jamaica Revolt of 1831. Th e latter event played a central 
role in forcing the English Crown to emancipate 800,000 
slaves in the British Caribbean three years later (Fick, 
1990; Turner, 1984; Craton, 1982). Given the existence 
of a triangular slave trade between Bahia, West Africa 
and Cuba, they were closely attuned to a cycle of slave 
revolts that broke out in Matanzas, Cuba, in 1843 and 
the repression that followed (Paquette, 1988; Landes, 
2010, p. 204-230). As thousands of angry and rebellious 
Africans arrived into cities and towns and countryside of 
Brazil during the 1830s and 1840s, these high-ranking 
offi  cials recognized that their wisest response at least for 
the short term was to halt importations.
Why would the ministers who attended the closed 
meeting of the Imperial Council of State that convened 
in January 1850 not have commented on the insecu-
rities caused by thousands of Africans in their midst? 
One reason might be traced to their racial biases. Th ese 
men had little respect for Africa or Africans. In fact, 
they detested the Africans in their midst. Th ey did not 
believe that Africans and their descendents had mental 
capacities equal to whites or even persons of mixed race. 
Th ey scorned the idea that Africans could organize and 
undermine a slave regime that had fl ourished for three 
centuries. Th ey did not want Brazil to become “another 
Africa” (Azevedo, 1987).
Furthermore, members of the Council of State 
did not wish to show their concerns about social insta-
bility to the free underclass. Th e ministers represented 
an elite that desired to maintain its wealth and status far 
into the future. Similar to the obfuscations of modern 
day politicians, a suggestion that their political decisions 
were a response to subaltern pressures was a sign of 
weakness. British aggressions at sea and along the coast gave 
added impetus to the cabinet to appear strong and capable.
In the months following passage of the Eusébio de 
Queiroz Law, several infl uential observers did comment 
on the pressures that contributed to political decisions 
taken in 1850. Minister of Foreign Aff airs Paulino José 
Soares de Sousa stated in May 1851:
50,000, 60,000, or 100,000 Africans had been im-
ported each year to Brazil. Would we not be advised by 
all moral considerations, by civilization, in our desire 
to ensure our own security and that of our children, to 
put an end to the importation of Africans?40
Arch-conservative senator Honório Hermeto 
Carneiro Leão asked of his colleagues in the Senate the 
same month:
40 Session of May 24, 1851 (ASIB, p. 320).
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Was not the level of importations of Africans [through 
1850] excessive, was it not too much, would it not have 
brought future dangers to the country [Brazil]? It is in 
our interest [to support the 1831 Brazilian law ending 
the slave trade], because the importation of Africans has 
been excessive, because the provinces from Bahia to the 
south found themselves overburdened with slaves; their 
number did not appear to be in proportion to the number 
of free persons. It was, then, in our interest, and to assure 
our future security, to take precautions in this respect, 
thereby halting the traffic, that, while it continued, 
increased our [internal, domestic] dangers. I think, Mr. 
President, that the time has come for the government to 
end this dangerous situation by putting a limit on the trade 
in slaves; and besides we have accepted this obligation.41
Twelve months later, in July 1852, no less a 
figure than Eusébio de Queiroz, the minister after 
whom the Brazilian law ending the slave trade was 
named, left no doubt that massive importations of 
the 1840s had been a key variable in shaping his 
perspectives:
if [public] opinion […] had brought about this revolu-
tion in the country, it was necessary for an occasion to 
present itself that would allow such a change to make 
itself known. Some events or, rather, signs of a grave 
nature, that revealed themselves one after the other in 
Campos [in the north of the province of Rio de Janei-
ro], [the province of ] Espírito Santo and some other 
places, such as the important counties of Valença and 
Vassouras [interior of the province of Rio de Janeiro], 
produced a terror that I shall call salutary, because it 
provided the opportunity for that opinion, contrary 
to the traffi  c, to develop further and make itself felt. 
All who found themselves in Rio de Janeiro at that 
time and who occupied themselves with this question 
recognized that it was the same planters who until 
then had preached the necessity of the traffi  c who 
now were the fi rst to contend that the moment for its 
suppression had arrived.42
A ﬁ nal reﬂ ection
Th e diff erences between the Enlightenment Scho-
ol and the Subaltern School might be characterized as a 
clash of interpretations. Th e former off ers insights into the 
worldview and positions of infl uential politicians. Th eir 
actions played a role in the demise of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade to Brazil. It is political and institutional history 
par excellence. Th e historians associated with the Subaltern 
School suggest that multiple factors caused the end of the 
slave trade to Brazil. One was the suppression eff orts of the 
British Squadron (Bethell, 1970; Th omas, 1997; Graden, 
2006, p. 4-9). Another included resistance by African 
slaves, freedpersons and liberated Africans.
Th e actions of British cruisers had a profound impact 
upon Africans in Brazil. Africans extricated from the holds 
of captured slave vessels hoped that their liberation would 
result in real freedom. Hundreds of these individuals settled 
in Salvador and Rio de Janeiro. Some liberated Africans 
protested strictures placed on them from the fi rst day they 
landed. African slaves and freedpersons laboring in towns 
and villages along the coast understood well that the actions 
of the British Squadron challenged powerful individuals and 
merchant houses that profi ted from a long established inter-
national trading system. Several aided in suppression eff orts, 
for example providing information and translation skills to 
British commanders and crews (Graden, 2011).
Many questions remain. A topic of great interest 
relates to the port of Salvador. Th e Africans who plied the 
harbor of Salvador in small boats had organized in the late 
1840s. Th ey appreciated that eff ective collaboration brought 
tangible benefi ts, such as monetary income. Th ey observed 
closely the movement of vessels through the port and along 
the coast. Th ey witnessed the machinations of traffi  ckers 
and the activities of the British Squadron. Africans commu-
nicated among themselves, with inhabitants of the city, with 
the interior of the province, with other ports and with the 
wider Atlantic World. Some remembered the Revolt of the 
Malês, or had learned of it from stories shared. One astute 
observer described the Bay of All Saints where Africans 
(slave and freed) ferried goods and persons as “that terrible 
nucleus of [slave] insurrections”.43 Th ese Africans did not 
sit idly by as the political winds shifted in favor of a halt to 
the despicable trade in human chattel. Some hoped that the 
end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade might bring soon after 
the demise of the institution of slavery. Th ey reached out to 
potential allies, including creole slaves residing in Salvador. 
Such endeavors merit the closest of scrutiny.
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